This paper establishes a simple model of long run economic and political development, which is driven by the inherent technical features of di¤erent production factors, and political con ‡icts among factor owners on how to divide the outputs. The main capital form in economy evolves from land to physical capital and then to human capital, which enables their respective owners (landlords, capitalists, and workers) to gain political powers in the same sequence, shaping the political development path from monarchy to elite ruling and …nally to full su¤rage. When it is too costly for any group of factor owners to repress others, political compromise is reached and economic progress is not blocked; otherwise, the political con ‡icts may lead to economic stagnation.
Introduction
At any time in human history, " [t] he e¤orts of men are utilized in two di¤erent ways: they are directed to the production or transformation of economic goods, or else to the appropriation of goods produced by others." (Vilfredo Pareto, as quoted in James 1984, p. 63) Indeed, the main story line of human history, Hirshleifer (1994) argues, may be driven by the balance between cooperative economic activities leading to greater aggregate wealth, and political con ‡icts over its distribution. This dichotomy seems to be a good description of the relevant economics literature as well. One stream of studies emphasizes the e¤ects of the former type of interactions on economic development. For example, Galor and Moav (2006) Built on the new insights emerged from these two lines of research, the current paper tries to integrate them to capture the organic links in-between. And in doing so, it delineates a long run coevolution path of economic and political development as illustrated in …gure 1. The accumulation of knowledge gradually changes the composition of capital stock and imposes "an evolutionary order upon the secular change of political and economic institutions" (North 1981, p. 208) . As the main factor of production shifts from land (before t k ) to physical capital (between t k and t h ) and then to human capital (after t h ), the relative economic and hence coercive powers of landlords, capitalists, and workers shift accordingly, inducing the transition of political system from monarchy (before T k ) to elite ruling (of landowners and capitalists between T k and T h ) and …nally to democracy with full su¤rage (after T h ). Every new political regime, by extending political power to the owners of the new form of capital and thus increasing their future economic gains from investment, speeds up economic progress. Such a smooth reinforcing coevolution path between economic and political development may not always be realized; repression and economic stagnation could also happen under certain conditions characterized in the model.
The main results of the paper are in general consistent with historical evidence. After the shift from hunting and gathering to agriculture, the predominance of land in production lasted thousands of years.
As Cipolla (1976, p. 183) observed, "until the nineteenth century the development of Europe, like that of any other preindustrial society, was ultimately constrained by the availability of land." Gradually, industry and service sectors replaced agriculture to become dominant economic activities, leading to the industrial revolutions in the last half of eighteenth century (North 1981, p. 159) . By the early twentieth century, the modern concept of the wealth of nations emerged: "It was that capital embodied in the people -human capital -mattered." (Goldin 2001) The correlation between the evolving composition of capital stock in economy and the corresponding political regimes is also widely observed. "The agrarian basis of Europe's political order dates back to the introduction of feudalism at the turn of the …rst millennium." (Bertocchi 2006a ). The ever growing economic strength of capitalists and landlords enables them to demand political power from the king. In Britain, for example, "Parliament became more sympathetic and accessible to the aspirations of merchants, masters and manufacturers, farmers and landowners" after the Glorious Revolution in 1688 (O'Brien 1994). The English experience, argued by Moore (1966, p. 429) , "tempts one to say that getting rid of agriculture as a major social activity is one prerequisite for successful democracy." In the second phase of the Industrial Revolution, the importance of human capital in the production process increased (Galor and Moav 2006) .
The rising human capital strengthened workers'economic power, which eventually led to franchise expansion in several European countries (Acemoglu and Robinson 2000) . The causal link between the level of economic development and political democracy is also con…rmed by cross-national statistical analyses and comparative historical research (Huber, Rueschemeyer and Stephens 1993) . Most democracies today have industrialized economies where human capital is the dominant capital form; in countries where natural resources are the main factors in production, authoritarian political regimes are more likely to happen than democracy (Lipset 1959 , Moore 1966 , Huber et al. 1993 , among others).
The paper is related to studies on long-term growth.
1 North (1981) proposes a dynamic framework of political economy and substantiates it by rewriting the Western history in its light. He recognizes not only the in ‡uence of technology advancement on political institutions, but also the e¤ects of political institutions on future technological and economic development. In some sense, the current paper is an attempt to formalize this dynamic framework in a simple model. It thus may shed light on the current debates on whether technology or institutions are more important in long-run growth. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005) argue that institutions are the fundamental cause of long-run growth, while Glaeser et al. (2004) development gaps.
The paper also contributes to our understanding of su¤rage extension. In the model, franchise expansion is driven by the increasing importance of human capital, which has two e¤ects: it shifts the balance of political power in workers' favor, while on the other hand it also reduces the potential loss of elites since the total outputs are larger after su¤rage extension. The con ‡ict of income distribution between the elites and workers is the focus of Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) , while the mutually bene…cial aspect of franchise expansion is proposed by Lizzeri and Persico (2004) and Llavador and Oxoby (2005) among others. Both views …nd support in historical evidence, as they should do, since they highlight two di¤erent but necessarily interrelated aspects of the same process. Furthermore, our basic idea of linking human capital and su¤rage extension is consistent with a range of related phenomena: The su¤rage was usually …rst extended to skilled workers, then to unskilled ones, and …nally to women, strictly following the ranking of their human capital levels; 2 in the U.S., the states with severe scarcity of labors extended su¤rage earlier and more broadly (Engerman and Sokolo¤ 2005) ; the emergence of mass democracy often coincides historically with industrialization.
To the extent that the cooperative and con ‡icting sides of human interactions are treated simultaneously, the paper is connected with Grossman and Kim (1995) and Grossman (2002) among others. Our results suggest that the cooperative side dominates history progress in the long run, though the con ‡icting side may change history paths for some time and often into the stagnant directions.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 the basic elements of the political economy model are introduced. Section 3 presents the analysis of the model. Further discussions and related historical evidence are collected in section 4. Some concluding remarks are o¤ered in the …nal section.
The Political Economy Model

The Economy
Preferences. There are overlapping generations in the economy. Each individual lives for two periods, childhood and adulthood, where generation t achieves adulthood in period t. They accumulate human capital in childhood and participate in the production process in adulthood. Individuals are identical in preferences, which are represented by a log-linear utility function
2 In Britain, for example, the su¤rage extension was to the middle class in 1832, to the urban working class in 1867, to the agricultural labourer in 1884, and …nally to women in 1919 and 1928.
Only when the productivity of an economy increases to the extent that someone's income is higher than Z, would there be any resources left as bequest. The total bequest in society is denoted by B t , which can be invested in either physical capital or human capital for the next generation.
Technology. In every period the economy produces a single homogeneous good that can be used for consumption and investment. The production function at time t is
where A t is the knowledge stock, L the quantity of land that is …xed overtime, K t the quantity of physical capital, and H t the e¢ cient units of human capital. Both physical and human capital depreciate completely after one period. The knowledge in society is accumulated through idle curiosity and learning-by-doing at a speed of g > 0 so that A t+1 = A t (1 + g). This knowledge accumulation process would be the ultimate growth engine in the economy.
The physical capital K t+1 is produced by capitalists combining material resources m k t and knowledge A t+1 . Its amount is also a¤ected by tax rate k;t+1 on capital returns. In speci…c, the physical capital production function is Note the three factors of production have di¤erent technical features: Land is exogenously given by nature and di¢ cult to be created or destroyed. Physical capital, in contrast, has to be produced with endogenous e¤ort and material investment, and it is easier to lose value if con…scated. These features also apply to human capital investment beyond the basic level that is endowed by nature. As the analysis will show, the complementarity among these three capital forms in production and their distinct technical features codetermine the sequence of the economic development path in …gure 1, while the exact timing is also a¤ected by institutional elements such as the political structure discussed below.
Demographic Structure. There are N L landowners and N C capitalists, which are few in the population and …xed over generations. The initial endowment of land among landowners is exogenously given and then passed on to their children, so is the ability of capitalists to generate physical capital. Landowners and capitalists participate in production using their assets rather than direct producing skills. The majority are workers who supply only human capital. Following Hansen and Prescott (2002) , the worker population N t is set to be consistent with the broad demographic trends in history, where the supply of raw labors keeps the real wage at the subsistence level w 0 , while the worker population becomes constant once costly education starts at t h . 4 That is,
The Political Structure
The division of products among the three groups of factor owners (landowners, capitalists, and workers) is determined by the political system, where the ruling group may exploit ruled agents through taxes and con…scation. The political structure of the society is ultimately shaped by the relative economic and bargaining powers of the agents.
We make two assumptions on the establishment and transition of political regimes. The …rst assumption is essentially might-is-right: the ruler group is composed of agents who have dominant violence potential than the ruled agents. This is in line with North's (1981, p. 21-22) theory of state where "the key to understanding the state involves the potential use of violence to gain control over resources. (...) The contract theory assumes an equal distribution of violence potential amongst the principals. The predatory 4 An endogenous account for such demographic changes is in Galor and Weil (2000) . theory assumes an unequal distribution."We take a more general approach, assuming the coercive ability of a group is determined by its collective economic power and organizing e¢ ciency.
In speci…c, suppose the violence ability v ti of an individual i at period t is proportional to his income Compromise is chosen, the challenging group moves next, choosing to accept the proposed compromise or reject it. When compromise is accepted, the game ends; if Reject is selected, the incumbent ruler moves in the last step deciding between Repress and Not Repress. The exact payo¤s and subgame perfect Nash equilibria are discussed in the next section. If mutual compromise is reached in equilibrium, the economic progress and political transition will proceed as in Figure 1 ; if not, repression, economic stagnation, and invasion may happen, which are not uncommon in history.
3 The Economic and Political Development
Land and Monarchy: [0; t k ]
The Economy. The initial state of our model economy corresponds to a time when agriculture is the dominant production method, and people are not educated. The productivity is so low that no saving is available for capital accumulation; the capitalists are thus not distinguishable from the worker group. Such 5 Due to the extremely long period (often in the magnitude of hundreds of years) the model covers, it is not realistic to assume agents can take into consideration of all the future economic and political changes when they make decisions. For example, Moore (1966, p. 30) observed that "it is unlikely that more than a very few people had any but the haziest notions as to ... what kind of a society might lie over the horizon." Allowing longer horizons and strategic options such as preemptive repression may alter the timing but not the qualitative results of the transition process. a situation will continue until period t k (determined below in (5)), which means h t = 1 and
A landlord i owns land L i and employs N ti workers at wage w t , where
where the optimal labor demand is N ti = ( wt A t ) 1 1 L i . Given the labor supply N t in (3), the subsistence wage level w 0 clears the labor market. So a landlord with land L i earns a pro…t
where
L; while the wage is …xed at w 0 : So the per capita output remains roughly constant over time, around Nt + w 0 = w0 :
The Political Game among Landowners. Initially there is no incumbent ruler, so the political game is determined completely by the rule of might-is-right, where landlords decide whether or not to grab the land of others by violence. Since by assumption the land is not destroyable, a landlord i by defeating another landlord j in the beginning of period t would get the latter's land that yields pro…t tj , while incurring a cost of $ tj equal to the violence level of j; so the net gain is (1 $) tj > 0.
Let be the set of all possible coalition that can be formed among landowners, and G 2 a generic element of the set. The following proposition shows that monarchy emerges as the political regime in equilibrium where the king owns the largest piece of land. 6 Proposition 1 (i) When land is the only capital, a monarchy is a political equilibrium immune to coalition:
The king is the biggest landowner who owns land L M , where
and imposes a tax rate of at least 1 $ on the other landlords' pro…ts; the distribution of land ownership is stable. (ii)
The …rst period the society starts to have surplus is
arrives earlier when L M and 1 $ are higher. 6 The violent potential of workers is not important now for three reasons. First, there is nothing to grab from a worker who already accepts the subsistence wage w 0 . Second, there is no gain for workers to help any landlords in …ghting since they always get the same wage w 0 no matter which landlord they are working for, given the aggregate labor supply. Third, workers are unable to challenge landowners as an individual and as a group due to their low income and low coalition e¢ ciency associated with the large number of them. Even if workers succeeded in getting all the lands, the equilibrium land distribution would not change from that described in the proposition. So workers would stay out of political games until after t h when human capital investment starts.
Proof. The monarchy is indeed an equilibrium since there are no pro…table deviations. No coalition is able to challenge the king given the land distribution, since the coercive power is proportional to one's pro…t and hence to land size. The king would not grab other landlords'lands since the tax rate 1 $ yields the same amount of revenue as doing so. The landlords would accept the tax because they get no bene…t from …ghting either as an individual or as a group. The landlords would not …ght each other because the net bene…t of doing so is at most zero: By grabbing another landlord j's land, one can get an after-tax pro…t not higher than $ j , which equals the …ghting cost he has to incur.
The king's total income T tM includes land pro…t tM and tax revenue (1 $)
where the second equality follows (4). Since t k is the earliest possible period that a society starts to have positive bequests and the king is the richest person, T t k ;M = Z must be true, which leads to (5) . It is obvious that t k decreases in L M ; L, and 1 $.
This proposition implies that the property rights of land are secure in the monarchy system, thanks to the overwhelming power of the king who protects the petty landowners for taxes. The aggregate outputs are also the highest since no resources are wasted in …ghting each other over land ownership, and the taxes are not distorting given that the total land size is …xed and no investment is feasible yet. The monarchy also facilitates economic development, since the high inequality of land ownership often shortens the time for a society to start investment in other forms of capital. As Cipolla (1976, p. 32) observed, "In a predominantly poor society lacking corrective means (...), a high concentration of wealth is an indispensable condition to the formation of saving." From these aspects, the monarchy is an appropriate or e¢ cient political regime when land is the only capital. This may explain why throughout history, "individuals given a choice between a state -however exploitative it might be -and anarchy, have decided for the former." (North 1981, p. 24) 3.2 Physical Capital and Elite Ruling:
With surplus available in society after t k , capitalists start to produce physical capital instead of working as raw labors. 7 Since producing physical capital requires special skills of capitalists, the king cannot get much value by con…scating their factories if the capitalists do not operate them; and physical capital is much easier to be hidden or destroyed by their owners, the capitalists, than land. To capture these insights, we assume con…scation brings less value to the king than imposing taxes on capital returns. The endogenous supply of 7 The assumption that capitalists do not emerge from landowners is consistent with historical evidence; see Doepke and Zilibotti (2005) for a plausible explanation.
physical capital marks its fundamental di¤erence from land; it reinforces the cooperative aspect and down plays the con ‡icting side of the relationship among factor owners. Such a change in economic arena will induce corresponding adjustments in the political system, where the political power is to be shared.
Physical Capital Accumulation
Capitalists borrow material resources from the king and rent the physical capital back to him at a market rate r t , while paying the king at a tax rate kt on capital returns. When the borrowing cost is positive, the return rate r t can be interpreted as the net rate earned by capitalists; without loss of generality, we normalize the borrowing cost at zero.
The choice sequence in each period t is as follows. The king …rst announces kt ; then capitalists produce
, taking as given r t ; kt and m
…nally the king decides his demand for capital and labor. The capital return rate r t and wage w 0 clear the capital and labor markets in equilibrium. The optimal choices are summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 1
The optimal tax rate k;t on capital returns is uniquely determined by K t + kt K 3 = 0 for t 2 (t k ; T k ) under monarchy. It maximizes the king's total revenue
Proof. In the appendix.
The ever increasing physical capital stock induces faster growth in the total output A
and worker population, while the per-capita output is still roughly constant at w0 as before. The king bene…ts from the process of capital accumulation through increased tax revenues. The economic development, however, would gradually build up pressure to challenge the absolute power of the king. Measured by beforetax revenues, the total economic power of the elites (the capitalists and landlords),
grows faster than the king's A 1 1 t L M ; and so does their coercive power.
The Political Game Between the King and Elites at T k
Suppose period T k is the …rst time when the elites would have the same coercive power as the king. Then
8 For simplicity we model the aggregate supply of physical capital in a reduced form rather than deriving it from individual behaviors. The king would …nd it optimal to invest only in physical capital at this time period; see proposition 3 for the formal proof.
At the beginning of period T k when the king still has slightly dominant coercive power, the elites and the king play the political game in Figure 2 . The king can use his incumbent advantage to repress the challenge by stagnating the economic and hence the coercive power of the elites. For example, he can freeze the physical capital stock at certain level K < K T k by directly con…scating their assets or spending his savings in non-productive ways (say in religion, arts, or jewelry) than lending them to capitalists. The king's income with Repress is
where k;T k is the optimal tax rate, and T k is the repression cost at period T k :
If a compromise is reached where the king and the elites share political power and impose zero tax on land and physical capital, the king's income shrinks to his land pro…t
If the king chooses Not Repress, the elites would gain the ruling power at the end of period T k based on might-is-right and con…scate the king's land or impose a tax rate 1 $ on it (by proposition 1). The net income of the king with Not Repress is
Note the king is always better o¤ choosing Compromise than Not Repress since c > n holds due to $ < 1; and both are independent of the repression cost T k . Whether Repress is a better choice for the king depends on how costly the repression is, since r strictly decreases in T k . The comparison between the three outcomes n , c and r is illustrated in …gure 3.
Lemma 2 There exist two unique levels of repression costs c and n ; where c < n , such that r > c >
For the elites, compromise is better than repression since under compromise the economic progress is not blocked and they pay no tax; and the case of no repression is even better since they get extra tax revenues from the King's land. When T k > n the king would choose 'Not Repress'after the compromise is rejected since r < n ; knowing this the capitalists would reject the compromise proposed by the king, and the SPE is (Compromise, Not
Repress; Reject).
The proposition suggests mutually bene…cial compromise can be reached only when the repression cost is in the middle range; when the repression cost is low, repression and economic stagnation are more likely to happen, and when it is very high, no-repression happens and the king loses his political power to the challenging group. All three cases have historical examples.
In Europe the contest for power is the routine : "an appropriate degree of rivalry among states may put pressure on the sovereign to decentralize power and provide political foundations for secure markets in order Where there are no strong rivals from competing states or potential rulers within his own state, the repression cost tends to be quite low and hence "the existing ruler characteristically is a despot, a dictator, or an absolute monarchy." (North 1981, p. 27 ) This is likely to happen when a kingdom is isolated geographically from others, or the neighbors are much weaker, such as in China or Egypt: "Ecumenical empires did not fear ‡ight, especially when, like China, they de…ned themselves as the center of the universe, the hearth and home of civilization, and everything outside as barbarian darkness. There was no other places to go." (Landes 1998 , p. 36) Similarly, "Egypt was isolated by desert and water from invaders and was not overrun until (...) at the end of the twelfth dynasty." (North 1981 , p. 95) The repression may continue for a long time until outside threats dramatically increase the repression costs and turn it into the no-repression case, where the incumbent is forced to yield political power to the challenging group. As globalization increases and the international political environment becomes more competitive, the possibility of repression is likely to go down.
Since the main interest of this paper is the long run coevolution path of economic and political development, we focus on the smooth case of T k 2 [ c ; n ], where the landlords and capitalists would share the political power and there is no income tax on them from period T k onwards.
Human Capital Investment and Full Su¤rage: [T k ; T h ]
During the initial periods under elite ruling, workers are still raw labors and paid the subsistence level of wage w 0 . Only when the physical capital stock is large enough would public education starts; the …rst period when this happens is t h , from then on human capital investment starts. The worker wages, however, still remain at w 0 until period t 0 h > t h when the disincentive of low wages on human capital accumulation is big enough, and they may never rise to the competitive levels under elite ruling due to concerns of political stability. But eventually, the elites will have to face the political challenge of workers as their human capital and wages continue to increase.
Wage Tax and Education Expenditure
Since human capital investment involves costly inputs and worker e¤ort, the supply of educated workers becomes limited. In speci…c, it is assumed constant at the level of N h N t h as in (3), where t h denotes the …rst period when human capital investment starts under the elite ruling. Given the labor supply N h , the competitive wage level
would clear the labor market. The actual wage for workers at period t + 1 is
where h ; t+1 2 [ ; t+1 ] is the implicit wage tax rate set by the ruling elites. The upper bound t+1 1 w0 w t+1
guarantees the lowest wage w 0 ; which allows workers to maintain living at the subsistence level. The lower
arises from the political concern: The aggregate income of workers is (1
, while the income of elites is (1 + h ; t+1 )Y t+1 . To prevent the workers' coercive power from being high enough to challenge the ruling of elites,
Note > 0 must be true if workers earning competitive wages can ever become dominant; but this implies h ; t+1 > 0 so that workers under elite ruling cannot get the full competitive wage w t+1 . On the other hand, h ; t+1 cannot be too high, otherwise workers are less willing to make e¤ort in accumulating desirable skills and hence their productivity would be low.
Suppose the elites …rst choose public education expenditure m h t and then the wage tax h ; t+1 : To capture the idea that the disincentive of tax on wages increases over time, h 2 + (1 + )h 23 < 0 is assumed. The optimal solutions are described in the following proposition. 
where T k < t h < t 0 h < T h , all of which are uniquely determined.
This lemma suggests that only when the surplus B t becomes large enough would investment in human capital starts at period t h ; before then only physical capital is accumulated. 9 And when the stock of knowledge is not high enough, the human capital is not very responsive to workers' e¤ort so that workers are still paid the subsistence wage w 0 in t 2 [t h ; t 0 h ] as before, even after human capital investment starts. A direct implication is that when human capital is not important in production or when worker e¤ort is not essential for human capital investment, the elites will set the optimal wage at w 0 . This is consistent with w 0 being the wage level under monarchy.
The Political Game Between Elites and Workers at T h
As the human capital stock goes up and wages continue to increase, the collective coercive power of workers also grows. It will eventually match that of the elites in period T h , when the optimal tax rate h ; T h reaches the lower bound : The political game between the elites and workers at period T h is the same as that between the king and the elites, where full su¤rage obtains and workers earn competitive wages w t+1 if compromise is reached. With similar arguments as in section 3.2.2, we get the following results. Proof. In the appendix.
A Smooth Development Path: Summary
If the repression costs remain in the middle ranges at both transition times T k and T h , a smooth economic and political development path is likely to be taken, where new production potentials are realized by adjusting political institutions accordingly. England seems to be such a case, where political compromises were reached in these crucial moments. The smooth evolving path of this type of political economy is summarized by the following proposition.
Proposition 5 When the repression costs are in the middle range where
that compromises between the incumbent ruler and the challenging group are reached, the political economy would evolve as follows. Physical capital accumulation starts at period t k while human capital investment starts at t h ; the per capita output stays constant before t h and starts to increase afterwards. Monarchy is the political equilibrium before period T k , then it's replaced by elite ruling of landlords and capitalists, and …nally, workers are also granted political rights and hence full su¤ rage is realized after period T h . The time path t k < T k < t h < T h suggests that economic development leads to political transition, which in turn facilitates future economic development.
This fast-track economic and political development is the one illustrated in …gure 1. During this process, the population of workers grew at the same rate as the total output (with faster growth rates when physical capital accumulation started after t k ) so that the per capita output was constant before human capital investment started at t h , after which the per capita output began to increase while the population stayed the same. After T h , all factor owners gain political power and earn competitive returns, which enables the economy to produce at its full capacity.
Roughly speaking, most OECD countries have experienced all the developmental stages and are now beyond T h . Many countries, however, are not so lucky as this benchmark path shows; when mutually bene…cial political compromise is not reached, the economic progress is often stagnated by political repressions. On the other hand, not every country has to go through every developmental stage described in the model, due
to various elements such as wars, colonization, and transnational economic activities. So our simple model paints only a broad brush picture of the long run development path, which is driven mainly by the technical features of di¤erent factors in production and political con ‡icts among self-interested factor owners on dividing the outputs. That said, the model is actually less restrictive than it appears, since many elements (such as cultures, religions, ideologies, racial concerns, and international environment), though not explicitly modeled, may implicitly a¤ect production functions and repression costs.
Historical Perspective and Further Discussions
This section gathers some historical evidence trying to convince the reader that the simple model analyzed above is relevant and useful in organizing our thoughts on long run economic and political development.
Our discussions below mainly focus on the history of Western Europe (esp. Britain) where the full time line suggested in the model has been realized, and political compromises were reached timely enough to avoid economic stagnation.
Land, Anarchy, and Monarchy. From the beginning of settled agriculture, about eight thousand years past before the peak of the Roman Empire. After the fall of the Roman Empire in the …fth century up to the year 1000, Europe was stagnate in income and population. The introduction of feudalism in the 9th century enabled Europe to gradually emerge from the anarchy and develop "a political-economic structure which produced su¢ cient order and stability to in turn induce changes leading to its breakdown (...)." (North 1981 , p. 124)
Since land is di¢ cult to destroy in …ghting, it has been the main target of endless …ghts and wars in centuries. The property rights of land are better protected in a monarchy system where the king uses his dominant coercive power to provide security for petty landlords in exchange of taxes. "While the ten millennia since the creation of settled agriculture appear in historical retrospect as an endless saga of war and of butchery, exploitation (however de…ned), enslavement, and mass murder, most often done by the state ruler or his agents, it is still essential to stress the necessity of a state for economic progress. Throughout history, individuals given a choice between a state -however exploitative it might be -and anarchy, have (O'Brien 1994) Indeed, "workers' living standards showed no clear progress before 1820." (Lindert 1994) The value of human capital in the production process was still limited in the …rst phase of the Industrial Revolution, when workers developed skills primarily through on-the-job training, and child labor was highly valuable. Its importance increased in the second phase, when workers'e¤ort also became a crucial element a¤ecting …rms' productivity; this prompted a sequence of education reforms in England since the 1830s, designed primarily to satisfy the increasing skill requirements (Galor and Moav 2006) .
Not surprisingly, after 1800, employers in Lancashire soon found that "they need more than a labor force that was available. They needed a labor force that was loyal, reliable, and motivated. To insure this they paid wages that soon became institutionalized as 'fair wages' (...)." (Huberman 1986 (Huberman , 1991 (Huberman , 1992 , as cited in Mokyr 1993, p. 91) Consistent with our assumption of the link between wage and worker e¤ort, Lazonick (1994) argued that "the contribution of workers to superior economic performance depends on their attitudes. Workers will only expend high levels of e¤ort in the production process if they expect to receive what they consider to be a 'fair share' in the consequent returns." However, due to intense competitive pressures, employers are often unable to make credible promises to workers that their shares would be 'fair'.
"By giving workers the assurance that their expectations for rewards would be met, collective organization made workers more willing to contribute high levels of e¤ort to production." "Eager to generate output for sale while there were pro…ts to be made, employers became receptive to sharing power with workers'
organizations" rather than …ghting unionization.
The increasing value of human capital shifted the power balance more favorable to workers, making their threat of violence a signi…cant factor in shaping the franchise expansion. In Britain, the motive to pass the First Reform Act in 1832 for su¤rage extension was to avoid social disturbances, which seems to be the consensus amongst historians. For example, Lang (1999, p. 36) concludes that "the level of unrest reinforced the case for immediate reform now, rather than later: it was simply too dangerous to delay any longer. Just as Wellington and Peel had granted emancipation to avoid a rising in Ireland, so the Whigs (...) should grant reform as the lesser of two evils."
On the other hand, the increasing importance of human capital also brought bene…ts to elites and hence made compromise more appealing than before. "The employers'acceptance of collective bargaining in turn opened the way for political transformations (...). In the eyes of the British political elite of the 1860s and 1870s the advent of cooperative industrial relations under the aegis of business-minded union leaders transformed craft workers from uncontrollable subversive into responsible citizens. One result was the 1867 extension of the right to vote to the better-paid of the workers" (Lazonick 1994 
Concluding Remarks
This paper establishes a simple model on the coevolution path of economic and political system, which is driven by the inherent technical features of di¤erent factors in production and the political con ‡icts among factor owners in output distribution. The dynamic economic progress transforms the main capital form in economy from land to physical capital and then to human capital, which enables their respective owners (landlords, capitalists, and workers) to gain political powers in the same sequence. When it is too costly for any group of factor owners to repress others, political compromise is reached and the economic progress is not blocked; otherwise, political con ‡icts may lead to repression of some factor owners and hence economic stagnation.
A main insight emerging from the paper is about the compatibility of economic and political development, which brings a developmental perspective into the discussions of appropriate or growth-enhancing political institutions. For instance, the paper suggests when natural resources are the main factor in production, imposing democracy may induce anarchy and stagnation; an alternative way is to help accumulate physical and human capital. Only when human capital becomes the dominant production factor in the economy, which often happens after a society has a large enough physical capital stock, would a political democracy be more likely to sustain itself and to facilitate further economic development.
On the other hand, many elements in society such as religions, cultures, geography, and history may in ‡uence development by a¤ecting the costs of political transition. For example, the willingness to make political compromise may greatly facilitate economic progress. As Mokyr (2005) argues, by the middle of the eighteenth century Britain had that "most elusive yet decisive institutional feature that makes for economic success: the ‡exibility to adapt its economic and legal institutions without political violence and disruptions.
Britain's great asset was (...) that its political institutions were nimbler, and that they could be changed at low social cost (...)." In contrast, one can imagine that in societies where people are conditioned to blindly obey authority, the institutions are more rigid and di¢ cult to change from within. In this aspect, the intense global competition in both political and economic terms, by increasing the outside threats to ine¢ cient economies, may lower the feasibility of repressive political regimes and hasten the development process.
issues. For example, the changing motivation, formats, and frequency of wars over time may also re ‡ect the shifts of capital stock composition. If democratic countries are necessarily highly invested in human capital, which is often true, it is not surprising that they seldom wage wars at each other: What is the point of conquering a nation whose main wealth is human capital? -The relevant parties could have been better o¤ by engaging each other in peaceful international trade. The evolution of education system, in terms of both contents and …nancing methods, may also be shaped by similar driving forces.
APPENDIX
Lemma 1.
Proof. We solve the king's decision problem from the last step, where his objective function is
The king's demand for labor is
; while the other landlords'demand is still the same as before:
L i for landlord i. So the total labor demand equals the labor supply
The optimal solution for physical capital is
Note the market rate of capital return r t is independent of land size and physical capital stock. The king's pro…t from his land, after plugging N tM and r t ; is tM = A 1 1 t L M ; which depends only on his land size and not on the physical capital used. This would also be true for the other landlords when they have positive bequests. That is, any landlord's pro…t is independent of the physical capital used and hence independent of the tax rate k;t imposed on capitalists. Without loss of generality, we assume the demand for physical capital is equal to its supply.
The total income of the king ( L + kt K t ) includes land pro…t plus tax revenues from land and physical capital. It depends only on the aggregate amount, not on the distribution, of either land or physical capital. So it would remain the same after the other landlords and the capitalists start to have positive bequests some periods later. The FOC K t + kt K = 0 yields the unique optimal tax rate k;t since the SOC 2K + kt K < 0 is satis…ed.
The physical capital stock K t = K(B t 1 ; A t ; kt ) increases over time since
where the …rst inequality obtains from K
given that
Lemma 2.
Proof. Conditions c r and r n can be simpli…ed to, respectively,
It is straightforward to see that c < n . holds based on (8); so the optimal wage tax h ; t+1 decreases in A t+1 , until it drops to the lower bound at period T h , which is uniquely determined by h ; T h = .
Taking as given h ; t+1 (m h t ); the FOC for m h t is
where h 1 (0; A t+1 ; h ; t+1 ) = and h(0; A t+1 ; h ; t+1 ) = 1 are substituted in (12) . For interior solutions we have @m
based on (11) . So the LHS in (12) also strictly increases in the total surplus B t , and it would eventually arise to zero at certain period t h , after which human capital investment starts. t h is thus de…ned by (12) at the equality. When t h T k , human capital investment starts under elite ruling; this is indeed the case when the capital stock at T k ; K T k in (6), is still small. In this case the total output is maximized at the social optimal level. 10 If the elites do not repress, workers would get exclusive political power after period T h . For simplicity suppose workers impose a uniform tax rate T h on both landowners and capitalists to maximize their income The challenging group, workers in this case, always prefer no repression to compromise, and compromise to repression. The fundamental features of this game are similar to that between the king and elites. The equilibrium results follow directly from the proof of proposition 2.
